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tiff's complaint" and, thus, presumably receives adequate notice
that the cross-claimant possesses a jurisdictional defense. Indeed,
it is submitted that the majority, by erecting such a requirement,
has created little more than a procedural trap for the unwary practitioner. It is hoped, therefore, that the Court of Appeals will reexamine both Bartley and Bides in light of the policy favoring joinder of claims,5 judicial economy,5s and basic fairness in the
administration of justice. Until it does so, however, defendants
who have a jurisdictional challenge should be aware that the assertion of a cross-claim which does not reserve a jurisdictional defense
automatically will subject them to the jurisdiction of the courts of
this state.
Susan D. Koester
INSURANCE LAW

Ins. Law § 167(8): Insurer's failure to disclaim liability or deny
coverage as soon as is reasonably possible does not result in coverage where the insurance carrier has insured neither the person
nor the vehicle involved in an automobile accident
Section 167(8) of the Insurance Law requires a liability insurer
to give to a claimant written notice of its disclaimer of liability or
See CPLR 2103(e) (1976).
See CPLR 320, commentary at 368-69 (1972). If an answer contains a jurisdictional
objection, it nevertheless may include counterclaims and cross-claims. Id. 3011 (1974). Assuming that a cross-claim is asserted in an answer which contains a jurisdictional challenge
to the plaintiff's complaint, it is clear that the cross-defendant will receive notice of such
objection since every party appearing in an action receives copies of all papers served upon
the other parties to that suit. See id. 2103(e) (1976).
58 See CPLR 601 (1976 & Supp. 1981-1982). Under the Civil Practice Act, disputes
between codefendants that were independent of the plaintiff's claim could not be asserted in
a cross-claim. See id. 601, commentary at 164-65 (1976). The CPLR, on the other hand,
permits any controversy between codefendants to be the subject of a cross-claim. Id. 601
(1976 & Supp. 1981-1982). Notably, if the rights of any party appear to be prejudiced by a
joinder of claims, the court may order separate tiials. See Note, supra note 54, at 110-11;
see also Newburgh v. Clarendon Gardens, Inc., 33 Misc. 2d 436, 436, 227 N.Y.S.2d 233, 23334 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962) (severance ordered if joinder will prejudice substantial
rights or cause confusion at trial).
, See CPLR 601 (1976) (joinder of claims); id. 602 (consolidation of actions); see also
Saunders v. Saunders, 54 Misc. 2d 1081, 1083, 283 N.Y.S.2d 969, 971 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1967) (public policy favoring complete relief in one action and avoidance of multiplicity of
suits); Kalmanowitz v. Solomon, 22 Misc. 2d 988, 989, 198 N.Y.S.2d 928, 931 (N.Y.C. Mun.
Ct. N.Y. County 1960) (joinder of action to reduce caseload of the court and its personnel
and to avoid waste of time, money and manpower).
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denial of coverage "as soon as is reasonably possible." 60 Indeed, it
has been recognized that a failure to provide such notice may result in a waiver of valid defenses which the insurer otherwise might
assert against the claim. 1 While this provision has been held appli60

N.Y. INs. LAw § 167(8) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). Section 167(8) provides:
If under a liability policy delivered or issued for delivery in this state, an
insurer shall disclaim liability or deny coverage for death or bodily injury arising
out of a motor vehicle accident or any other type of accident occurring within this
state, it shall give written notice as soon as is reasonably possible of such disclaimer of liability or denial of coverage to the insured and the injured person or
any other claimant.
Id. This subdivision was enacted as part of the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification
Corporation Law, ch. 759, § 3, [1958] N.Y. Laws 1624, (current version at N.Y. INs. LAw §
167(8) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982)), which also created the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC). Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gross, 27 N.Y.2d 263, 267, 265
N.E.2d 736, 737, 317 N.Y.S.2d 309, 311 (1970). Since the Motor Vehicle Financial Security
Act of 1956, ch. 655, § 2, [1956] N.Y. Laws 1457, was inadequate to serve the purpose of a
compulsory automobile insurance scheme, see N.Y. INs. LAw § 600 (McKinney 1966), the
MVAIC was enacted "to fill the gaps" in such a plan. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Godwin, 46
App. Div. 2d 154, 157, 361 N.Y.S.2d 461, 464 (4th Dep't 1974); In re Askey, 30 App. Div. 2d
632, 632, 290 N.Y.S.2d 759, 761 (4th Dep't 1968), affrd, 24 N.Y.2d 937, 250 N.E.2d 65, 302
N.Y.S.2d 576 (1969). Specifically, the purpose of the MVAIC is to provide a source of indemnification for otherwise uninsured, innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents if they
are injured under certain circumstances. N.Y. INs. LAw § 600 (McKinney 1966). For example, among the injuries previously uncovered by the former legislation were those caused by
"insured motor vehicles where the insurer disclaims liability or denies coverage." See id.
Under the current compulsory automobile insurance scheme, however, the liability of the
MVAIC may be triggered by an insurer's valid disclaimer. See id. § 620.
An important reason for requiring an insurer to give timely notice of its disclaimer is
that it will enable the MVAIC to investigate potential claims as early as possible, in the
event that the disclaimer is upheld and the MVAIC is required to defend. Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Gross, 27 N.Y.2d 263, 267, 265 N.E.2d 736, 737, 317 N.Y.S.2d 309, 312 (1970); Olenick v.
Government Employees Ins. Co., 68 Misc. 2d 764, 770, 328 N.Y.S.2d 50, 56 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1971), modified on other grounds, 42 App. Div. 2d 760, 346 N.Y.S.2d 320 (2d Dep't
1973). Additionally, prompt disclaimer or denial of coverage enables injured parties to recover more expeditiously, since delay in giving such notice may cause them to commence
costly litigation against the insurer rather than seek settlement through the MVAIC. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gross, 27 N.Y.2d 263, 267, 265 N.E.2d 736, 737-38, 317 N.Y.S.2d 309, 312
(1970); Olenick v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 68 Misc. 2d 764, 770, 328 N.Y.S.2d 50,
56 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971), modified on other grounds, 42 App. Div. 2d 760, 346
N.Y.S.2d 320 (2d Dep't 1973); see Appell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 906, 907,
255 N.Y.S.2d 545, 547 (2d Dep't 1964), afl'd, 17 N.Y.2d 519, 214 N.E.2d 792, 267 N.Y.S.2d
516 (1966); cf. Ashland Window & Housecleaning Co., v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co., 269
App. Div. 31, 34-35, 53 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 (1st Dep't 1945) (insurer's delay in denying coverage misled insured into neither preparing a defense nor seeking a settlement); Merchants
Mut. Casualty Co. v. Wildman, 21 Misc. 2d 1073, 1075, 197 N.Y.S.2d 925, 928 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County), afl'd, 12 App. Div. 2d 664, 209 N.Y.S.2d 242 (2d Dep't 1960) (insurer's
delay in denying coverage caused action by insured against uninsured motorist to be timebarred), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 985, 176 N.E.2d 513, 218 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1961).
"1See Hartford Ins. Co. v. Nassau, 46 N.Y.2d 1028, 1029, 389 N.E.2d 1061, 1062, 416
N.Y.S.2d 539, 540 (1979); State v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 70 App. Div. 2d 687, 689-90, 416

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:178

cable to all insurance contracts regardless of the specific terms of
the policy,62 it has not been applied where the contractual relation-

ship between the parties has terminated.6 3 Recently, in Zappone v.
Home Insurance Co.,64 the Court of Appeals held that section

167(8) does not apply to an automobile insurance carrier which has
insured neither the vehicle involved in an accident nor the driver
incurring the liability. 5
In Zappone, the plaintiff was involved in a collision while
driving an automobile owned by his sister and insured by Aetna
Insurance Company.6 At the time of the accident, the plaintiff's
N.Y.S.2d 403, 406 (3d Dep't 1979). Among the reasons for which an insurer validly may
deny liability are failure by the insured to cooperate in the lawsuit, see Coleman v. New
Amsterdam Casualty Co., 247 N.Y. 271, 276, 160 N.E. 367, 369 (1928); National Grange

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 26 App. Div. 2d 528, 529, 271 N.Y.S.2d 74, 75 (1st Dep't 1966), lack
of timely notice of an accident by the insured, see Security Mut. Ins. Co. v. Acker-Fitzsimons Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 436, 440, 293 N.E.2d 76, 78, 340 N.Y.S.2d 902, 905 (1972); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Furman, 84 App. Div. 2d 29, 32-33, 445 N.Y.S.2d 236, 239 (2d Dep't 1981), and
existence of an exclusion in the policy that covers the circumstances of the claim, see, e.g.,
Newman v. Ketani, 54 App. Div. 2d 926, 927-28, 388 N.Y.S.2d 128, 129-30 (2d Dep't 1976)
(exclusion covering vehicles used for other than private purposes valid if timely notice of
disclaimer had been given). In order to preserve its right to disclaim liability or deny coverage, the insurer's notice must be more than a mere letter reserving its rights. See, e.g., Hartford Ins. Co. v. Nassau, 46 N.Y.2d 1028, 1029, 389 N.E.2d 1061, 1062, 416 N.Y.S.2d 539, 541
(1979); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gross, 27 N.Y.2d 263, 269, 265 N.E.2d 736, 738, 317 N.Y.S.2d 309,
313 (1970). Additionally, the insurer's notice must provide the claimant with all the grounds
for the insurer's position, or else the unasserted grounds will be deemed waived. See General
Accident Ins. Group v. Cirucci, 46 N.Y.2d 862, 864, 387 N.E.2d 223, 225, 414 N.Y.S.2d 512,
514 (1979).
'2 See Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baranowski, 105 Misc. 2d 669, 670-71, 432
N.Y.S.2d 766, 767-68 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1980). Originally, section 167(8) applied exclusively to motor vehicle accidents, but it was amended to include any type of accident
resulting in death or bodily injury. See N.Y. Ins. Law, ch. 775, § 1, [1975] N.Y. Laws 1208
(McKinney). The timely notice requirement of this subdivision applies both to primary and
to excess liability policies. See Preisch v. Continental Casualty Co., 55 App. Div. 2d 117,
122, 389 N.Y.S.2d 700, 703-04 (4th Dep't 1976).
03 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Elgot, 48 App. Div. 2d 362, 365, 369 N.Y.S.2d
719, 721 (1st Dep't 1975); Perez v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 31 App. Div. 2d 895,
896, 297 N.Y.S.2d 875, 876 (1st Dep't 1969) (per curiam), aft'd, 26 N.Y.2d 625, 255 N.E.2d
722, 307 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1970); cf. Zappone v. Home Ins. Co., 80 App. Div. 2d 661, 662, 436
N.Y.S.2d 402, 404 (3d Dep't 1981) (contractual relationship never existed in the first instance), aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 131, 432 N.E.2d 783, 447 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1982). The court in Perez
stated that "subdivision 8 of section 167 of the Insurance Law does not refer to a situation
...
where coverage had terminated due to a cancellation of the policy long before the happening of the accident." 31 App. Div. 2d at 896, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
- 55 N.Y.2d 131, 432 N.E.2d 783, 447 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1982), aff'g 80 App. Div. 2d 661,
436 N.Y.S.2d 402 (3d Dep't 1981).
65 55 N.Y.2d at 135-36, 432 N.E.2d at 786, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
66 Id. at 134, 432 N.E.2d at 785, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 913. The plaintiff was operating the
vehicle, a Mercedes Benz, with his sister's permission. Id.
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sister and father owned other vehicles which were insured by the
defendant, Home Insurance Company.17 After being sued by two of
the persons injured in the collision, 8 the plaintiff and his sister
notified the defendant-insurer of the accident.6 9 Fifteen months
later, the defendant notified the plaintiff and his sister that it
would not provide coverage since the vehicle involved in the accident was neither an "owned automobile" nor a "non-owned automobile" under the policies carried for the plaintiff's family.70 A de-

claratory action thereafter was commenced seeking a determination that the plaintiff was entitled to coverage under the policy provided by the defendant and, additionally, that the defendant's disclaimer was untimely under section 167(8) of the Insurance Law.71 Trial term granted the relief sought, but the Appellate

Division, Third Department, reversed. 2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. 3 Judge Meyer,
writing for the majority,74 initially stated that the defendant's denial of coverage was not "by reason of exclusion, 75 but rather was
based upon a "lack of inclusion

7

6

since there was no existing pol-

77
icy covering the driver or the vehicle involved in the accident.

Id. The plaintiff's sister owned an MG and his father owned a Chevrolet. Id.
Id. Aetna Insurance Company undertook the defense of the plaintiff and his sister in
the claim arising out of the accident, and offered to settle up to the limit of its policy. Id.
19 Id. The plaintiff notified Home Insurance Company of the accident 6 months after it
had occurred. Id. Two weeks after being so notified, the defendant advised the plaintiff that
it would investigate the claim, and that it was reserving its rights under the policy due to
the plaintiff's late notice. Id.
70 Id. at 134-35, 432 N.E.2d at 785, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
71 Id. at 135, 432 N.E.2d at 785, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 135-36, 432 N.E.2d at 785-86, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 913-14.
74 Judge Meyer was joined by Judges Jones, Jasen and Wachtler. Judge Gabrielli dissented in a separate opinion in which Chief Judge Cooke and Judge Fuchsberg concurred.
75 55 N.Y.2d at 136, 432 N.E.2d at 786, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 914. Judge Meyer noted that an
insurer's denial of liability could arise from a policy exclusion. Id. Such an exclusion might
include a situation where an insured's employee was injured in the course of his employment, or where injuries were sustained in an automobile insured exclusively as a private
vehicle, but was being used as a public conveyance at the time of the accident. Id. The
Court observed that in these situations, the policy would cover the driver, the vehicle, and
the accident, but for the existence of the policy exclusion which the carrier must assert so as
not to mislead the claimant into believing that policy coverage attached. Id.
76 Id. The Court stated that liability may be denied when an insurance contract does
not cover the person or the vehicle involved in an accident, or when such a contract did
exist but was terminated or cancelled prior to the accident. Id.
7 See id. In addition to denial of coverage "by reason of exclusion" or due to "lack of
inclusion," the Court stated that an insurer might deny coverage when af insured breaches
a term of the policy. Id. Such a breach might occur, noted the Court, when an insured fails
17
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Rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the plain language of the
statute mandates its application to all instances in which a carrier
denies liability, 7s the Court observed that the purpose of section
167(8) is to avoid prejudice to a claimant resulting from a delay in
learning of the carrier's position, rather than to create indemnification for which the parties had not contracted.7 e Finally, Judge
Meyer noted that because other courts have held section 167(8)
inapplicable when an insurance contract which would have provided coverage has been cancelled, the section likewise should not
apply to a policy which never contemplated the carrier's liability in
the first instance.8 0
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Gabrielli found no logical distinction between an insurer's denial of coverage "by reason of exclusion" and its denial based upon a "lack of inclusion."8 1 Maintaining that a literal reading of the statute can best aid interpretation
of legislative intent, the dissent argued that section 167(8) should
be applied to all denials of coverage since no unreasonable or unjust consequences would result.82 Indeed, Judge Gabrielli emphato cooperate in the defense of a lawsuit brought by an injured party, or when the insured
does not give notice of an accident which has occurred or of an action brought against the
insured. Id.; see supra note 61.
78 55 N.Y.2d at 137, 432 N.E.2d at 786-87, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 914-15. The Court emphasized that the mere fact that a statute's wording appears unambiguous does not dictate a
literal interpretation of that language when such a construction would "occasion great inconvenience, or produce inequality, injustice or absurdity." Id., 432 N.E.2d at 786, 447
N.Y.S.2d at 914 (citing Hogan v. Culkin, 18 N.Y.2d 330, 335, 221 N.E.2d 546, 549, 274
N.Y.S.2d 881, 885 (1966); Petterson v. Daystrom Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 32, 38, 215 N.E.2d 329,
331, 268 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1966); In re Meyer, 209 N.Y. 386, 389, 103 N.E. 713, 714 (1913)).
79 55 N.Y.2d at 137, 432 N.E.2d at 787, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 915. Judge Meyer reasoned that
the application of section 167(8) to situations not contemplated in the liability policy would
violate the legislative mandate that premium rates should be reasonably related to the risks
assumed by the parties. Id. at 138, 432 N.E.2d at 787, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 915 (citing N.Y. INs.
LAW §§ 180, 183-186 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982)).
80 55 N.Y.2d at 138-39, 432 N.E.2d at 787-88, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 915-16 (citing Perez v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 31 App. Div. 2d 895, 896, 297 N.Y.S.2d 875, 876 (1st Dep't
1969) (per curiam), afl'd, 26 N.Y.2d 625, 255 N.E.2d 722, 307 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1970)). The
Court characterized the cancellation and "lack of inclusion" situations as instances in which
there is no coverage, and, thus, no duty on the part of the insurer to disclaim liability. 55
N.Y.2d at 138-39, 432 N.E.2d at 787-88, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 915-16.
8155 N.Y.2d at 140, 432 N.E.2d at 788, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 916 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
The dissent focused only upon the situations in which a policy exclusion exists or where a
policy does not cover the person or vehicle involved in the accident. See id. (Gabrielli, J.,
dissenting). Judge Gabrielli agreed with the majority that section 167(8) does not apply
when a policy has expired since such expiration terminates the insurer-insured relationship.
See id. at 140 n.1, 432 N.E.2d at 788 n.1, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 916 n.1 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 140-41, 432 N.E.2d at 788-89, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 917 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
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sized, because of the complex nature of the documents typically
used in insurance contracts, the legislature must have intended
that a liability insurer under any policy bear the burden of notify3
ing the insured as to whether a particular accident is covered.
Moreover, the dissent urged, when an insurer fails to deny coverage promptly, its potential liability remains the same regardless
of
84
the ground upon which a denial could have been based.
It is submitted that the Zappone decision is tenuous insofar as
it is premised upon the semantic distinction between noncoverage
by reason of a "lack of inclusion" and noncoverage based upon a
policy exclusion.8 5 In either instance, it is apparent that a contract
forms the basis of a concrete relationship between the insurance
carrier and the owner or driver of a particular vehicle.8 6 When an
insurer denies coverage by reason of exclusionary language in the
policy, it is evident that the existence of this relationship alone,
rather than the specific terms of the contract, triggers the applicability of section 167(8). 87 The Zappone Court, however, failed to
Id. at 141, 432 N.E.2d at 789, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 917 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
- Id. at 141-42, 432 N.E.2d at 789, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 917 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 137, 432 N.E.2d at 786, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 914. The Zappone Court stated that
there was a "basic distinction" between a lack of coverage "by reason of exclusion" and
noncoverage "by reason of lack of inclusion" despite the fact that both situations could be
denominated as denials of coverage. Id. The dissent noted, however, that "the majority
provid[ed] no rationale for distinguishing the two." Id. at 140, 432 N.E.2d at 788, 447
N.Y.S.2d at 916 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
96 It is suggested that the mere fact of an insurance policy's existence creates a relationship between the insurance carrier and the person holding that policy, even if the policy
does not cover the particular liability incurred. This situation is distinguishable from that in
which a policy no longer exists. See, e.g., Perez v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 31 App.
Div. 2d 895, 896, 297 N.Y.S.2d 875, 876 (1st Dep't 1969) (per curiam), a'fld, 26 N.Y.2d 625,
255 N.E.2d 722, 307 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1970). Indeed, in Perez, the court stated that
"[s]ubdivision 8 of 167 of the Insurance Law does not refer to a situation ... where coverage terminated due to a cancellation of the policy long before the happening of the accident." 31 App. Div. 2d at 896, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 876. In such a case, it would appear that any
relationship between the parties ends at the time when the insurance contract is terminated.
87 It has been held that the notice required by section 167(8) must be given in instances
where a policy exclusion purposely was inserted to indicate that certain liability was not
covered by the contract. Newman v. Ketani, 54 App. Div. 2d 926, 927-28, 388 N.Y.S.2d 128,
129-30 (2d Dep't 1976). It would appear, therefore, that it is not the policy's contemplated
coverage which brings the section 167(8) requirement into play. In Newman, for example,
the automobile insurance policy in question contained an exclusionary clause applicable to
the specific facts and upon which the insurer based its denial of coverage. Id. at 927, 388
N.Y.S.2d at 129. The court held that since the insurer did not provide notice of its disclaimer until more than 4 years after the action was commenced, the timeliness of such
notice, rather than the propriety of the disclaimer, presented a question of fact properly to
be decided in the lower court. Id. at 927-28, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 130.
83
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recognize the importance of this relationship in determining that
section 167(8) does not take effect if an insurer denies coverage
due to the existing policy's "lack of inclusion."8' 8
Furthermore, it is suggested that in making the applicability
of the notice requirement dependent upon whether the liability is
incurred by an insured person or vehicle, the Court failed to consider a vehicle owner's vicarious liability." It seems incongruous
that an automobile owner who is otherwise "insured" against liability under an automobile insurance policy is denied the benefit of
section 167(8) notice merely due to the manner in which his liability arose. Indeed, pursuant to the Court's reasoning, vicarious liability seems to strip an automobile owner of his status as a "covered person," thereby eliminating the notice requirement, whereas
no such "stripping" effect occurs where the nature of the damage
resulting in liability to an owner is specifically excluded by the policy even though the owner is equally uninsured.9 0
Finally, under the Court's decision, a claimant not privy to the
precise terms of an insurance contract will be unaware of whether
notice of noncoverage is forthcoming, thereby becoming exposed to
the same prejudice that the legislature sought to obviate by the
enactment of section 167(8).91 In view of the theoretical, equitable
See 55 N.Y.2d at 137-38, 432 N.E.2d at 787, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
Although the owner of a vehicle would not be liable for the negligence of its driver at
common law, except under the theory of respondeat superior or agency, such liability has
been imposed by statute in New York where the driver is operating the vehicle with the
owner's consent. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388(1) (McKinney 1970). See generally
Plath v. Justus, 28 N.Y.2d 16, 20, 268 N.E.2d 117, 118-19, 319 N.Y.S.2d 433, 435-36 (1971).
New York State further requires that "policies of insurance issued to the owner of any
vehicle subject to [vicarious liability] shall contain a provision for indemnity or security
against [such liability]." N.Y. VEH. & TRt. LAW § 388(4) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982) (emphasis added); see N.Y. INs. LAW § 167(2) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). There is no requirement, however, that the vehicle in which the liability is incurred be the subject of the
insurance policy for the statutes to be effective, provided that the owner is issued the policy.
See supra note 85.
" See supra note 60 and accompanying text. Prior to the enactment of section 167(8)
of the Insurance Law, an insurer was estopped from disclaiming liability if the claimant
could show that he was prejudiced as a result of the insurer's late notice. See, e.g., S. & E.
Motor Hire Corp. v. New York Indem. Co., 255 N.Y. 69, 74-75, 174 N.E. 65, 67 (1930); Gerka
v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 251 N.Y. 51, 56-57, 167 N.E. 169, 170-71 (1929). Accordingly, in
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gross, 27 N.Y.2d 263, 265 N.E.2d 736, 317 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1970), the
defendant-insurer contended that the disclaimer of liability or denial of coverage required
by section 167(8) need only be given in a timely fashion if prejudice would result to the
claimant. Id. at 265, 265 N.E.2d at 736, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 310. The Court of Appeals, however, refused to recognize this argument, stating that "[w]hether the absolute rule [of section 167(8)] was enacted because of a presumption of prejudice from any undue delay or for
88
88
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and practical difficulties engendered by Zappone, therefore, it is
hoped that the Court will seize the first opportunity to reevaluate
its position regarding the applicability of section 167(8)'s notice requiremerit when an insurer denies coverage by reason of a "lack of
inclusion."
Gerald A. Hefner

DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW

YORK LAW

Custodial statements made by youth to his parent are inadmissible where youth was neither accorded privacy nor warned that
overheard statements may be used against him
In order to protect the privacy of certain confidential relationships, the New York legislature has created a number of evidentiary privileges which preclude the compelled disclosure of various
communications.9 2 Notwithstanding the early unwillingness of
some other reason is of no moment. The statute lays down an unconditional rule." Id. at
269-70, 265 N.E.2d at 739, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 314. Indeed, the Court noted that to require such
prejudice under the present statute would be to "[miss] the point of the statute, and the
evident purpose for its enactment." Id. at 269, 265 N.E.2d at 739, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
Thus, the Court stated, the insurer's failure to give written notice of disclaimer to the claimant for 7 months was unreasonable despite the fact that no actual prejudice resulted. Id.
92See CPLR 4502(b) (1963) ("husband or wife shall not be required, or, without consent of the other .... allowed to disclose a confidential communication made by one to the
other during marriage"); id. 4503(a) (privilege extending to confidential communications between attorney and client); id. 4504(a) (physician-patient privilege); id. 4505 (a clergyman
"shall not be allowed to disclose a confession or confidence made to him in his professional
character as spiritual advisor"); id. 4507 (confidential communications between a psychologist and his patient are "placed on the same basis as those provided by law between attorney and client"); id. 4508 (social worker may "not be required to disclose a communication
made by his client to him ... in the course of his professional employment"). Each privilege specified in the CPLR is subject to exception. The spousal privilege, for example, only
protects those exchanges that "would not have been made but for the absolute confidence
in, and induced by, the marital relationship." People v. Melski, 10 N.Y.2d 78, 80, 176
N.E.2d 81, 83, 217 N.Y.S.2d 65, 67 (1961). Similarly, the attorney-client privilege only
shields those communications made in confidence, or intended to be made in confidence, by
a client seeking professional advice. In re Jacqueline F., 47 N.Y.2d 215, 219, 391 N.E.2d 967,
970, 417 N.Y.S.2d 884, 887 (1979). The physician-patient privilege is restricted to "medical
information, or at least information which is relevant to some medical purpose" given by a
patient to his doctor. CPLR 4504, commentary at 197 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982); see
Polsky v. Union Mut. Stock Life Ins. Co., 80 App. Div. 2d 777, 778, 436 N.Y.S.2d 744, 745
(1st Dep't 1981) (privilege did not extend to the patient's discussion of suicide with his
dentist). To be entitled to claim the clergyman-penitent privilege, the penitent must have
been seeking "religious counsel, advice, solace, absolution or ministration" from the clergyman when he made the statement in question. In re Fuhrer, 100 Misc. 2d 315, 320, 419

